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I. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
A. Justiciability
The concept of justiciability involves the appropriateness of judicial
action' and provides justification for refusals to exercise jurisdiction.
Various aspects of nonjusticiability have developed into identifiable
categories; these include advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases,
standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions and administrative
questions.' The Ninth Circuit dealt with two of these categories, moot-
ness and standing, during the survey period.
1. Mootness
It is the duty of a federal court "to decide actual controversies by a
judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions
upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before
it."' "[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."
4
The existence of a claim for more than minimal damages is generally
sufficient to prevent a finding of mootness.5 Thus, a damage claim may
protect a suit for injunctive relief against a finding of mootness and
prompt the court to consider the merits of plaintiff's entire complaint.
6
1. The power of the federal courts derives from U.S. CONST. art. III, which states in perti-
nent part: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . [and] to Controversies .... "
2. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529,
at 146 (1975)[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
3. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895).
4. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). See generally Kates, Mootness in Judi-
cial Proceedings: Toward a More Coherent Theory, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1385 (1974); Mootness
on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672 (1970). For a discussion of various
categories of mootness that have been considered by the courts, see The Mootness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1974). Cases are not likely to be considered moot
if they involve the possibility of future adverse effects or the possibility of recurrence of the
dispute at issue. See, e.g., Carafas v. LaValle, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (although petitioner had
been released before appellate review, as a result of his conviction he was unable to engage
in certain businesses, to serve as a union official for a specified time, to vote, or to serve as a
juror; these were considered the collateral consequences of his conviction); United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (case not moot where there is a danger of recur-
ring violation; resignation of the individual defendant from the boards of the three corporate
defendants did not moot an interlocking directorate charge since there was the possibility
that the defendant might regain his positions with the same corporations). But cf. Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969) (claim that prohibition against anonymous handbilling was
unconstitutional was rendered moot when candidate against whom challenger intended to
campaign assumed fourteen-year judicial post).
5. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
6. Abrams v. Hills, 547 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1976) (questions as to the obligation of
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In Moore v. Johnson,7 veterans who were receiving care at a certain
Veterans Administration facility sought injunctive relief and damages
in connection with a proposal to move them to another facility.8 The
court held that the actual relocation of the veterans would not render
the case moot since the complaint contained a prayer for damages. 9
Consequently, the court considered both the request for injunctive re-
lief as well as the claim for damages.
Cases generally will not be held moot if they are "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review."'" The two aspects of this doctrine, repetition
and evasion, may be considered separately." When the controversy
has ceased to exist and there is little or no possibility that it will be
repeated, it is moot.' 2 On the other hand, a controversy which has
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to implement an operating subsidy pro-
gram to reduce rentals of tenants in a low-income housing project were not rendered moot
by reduction of the rents to the same level as under other programs, since the district court
had ordered retroactive payments); Bartenders & Culinary Workers Union Local 340 v.
Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160, 1162 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976) (expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement did not moot a suit for enforcement since damage claims remained);
Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 419 n.2 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'don other grounds, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)
(controversy concerning an election not moot after election has occurred where plaintiff also
sought damages for violation of state law).
7. 582 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1978).
8. Id. at 1231.
9. Id. at 1232.
10. This phrase had its genesis in Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-
15 (1911) (short-term ICC order that had expired before the case reached the Supreme
Court). See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976) (case not moot
simply because an order restraining news media from publishing or broadcasting accounts
of confessions or admissions made by the accused to law enforcement officers had expired,
since the controversy was capable of repetition yet, if jurisdiction was not exercised, evading
review); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (case challenging actions of parole
board members in considering respondent's eligibility for parole rendered moot by respon-
dent's parole, since it was not demonstrated that respondent would be subject to the parole
system again); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (natural termination of pregnancy did
not render moot an action challenging state-imposed restrictions on abortions, since issue
was capable of repetition yet evading review); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (class
action challenging durational residency requirements for voting not mooted when the
named plaintiff became eligible to vote).
11. See Williams v. Alioto, 549 F.2d 136, 142 (9th Cir. 1977) (case seeking to enjoin San
Francisco Police Department from stopping, frisking and questioning black males meeting
the general description of the "Zebra Killer" held moot when four defendants were con-
victed and the homicides ceased).
12. Id See also Board of School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129 (1975) (purported
class action challenging the constitutionality of certain school rules and regulations rendered
moot when all members of the class graduated); SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights,
404 U.S. 403, 406 (1972) (case seeking to require Dow Chemical Company to include a
resolution in the company's proxy statement prohibiting the use of napalm against human
beings, held moot when Dow voluntarily included the proposal and less than three percent
of the voting shareholders supported it); Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1969) (class action
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ceased to exist will not be held moot if it is of a type which "in its
duration is too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expira-
tion." 3
In considering a challenge to a state statute prohibiting corporations
from participating in ballot issues, the Ninth Circuit, in C & C Plywood
Corp. V. Hanson,14 held that the case was not moot even though the
election process being contested had been completed. The governing
factors were the impossibility of complete judicial review within the
time period for a similar ballot measure and the likelihood that a simi-
lar measure would appear on the ballot in the future.
15
In Allen v. Monger, 6 an attack on military regulations which re-
quired prior approval for petitioning activity was not moot despite the
fact that one of the ships involved was no longer in service, the peti-
tioners had been discharged and it was highly unlikely that any of the
petitioners would be confronted with the problem again. The
probability that other military enlistees would seek similar judicial re-
view and find it unavailable before their terms of enlistment expired,
coupled with the seriousness of the questions raised, were the decisive
factors in permitting review.' 7
2. Standing
The issue of standing is one aspect of the "case or controversy" re-
quirement of article III.8 In order to have standing to sue, the plaintiff
must have a "personal stake" in the case' 9 and be able to demonstrate
challenging voting residency requirements rendered moot when the requirement was
changed from six months to two months and all named plaintiffs met the new residency
requirement).
13. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).
14. 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978). Other constitutional aspects of this case are discussed at
notes 29-32 & 76-85 infra.
15. Id. at 423. The court in Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd oil other
grounds, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (dictum), considered a suit involving the election process and
noted that
election controversies almost always are spawned shortly before the election, seek pro-
spective relief directed to the election, and reach the appellate courts only after the
election. Where the basis of such a controversy remains after an election and where the
dispute is likely to recur, the case will not be found moot, even where prospective relief
alone is sought.
Id. at 419.
16. 583 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1978). Other constitutional aspects of this case are discussed at
notes 133-41 infra.
17. 583 F.2d at 440.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). It is not sufficient for plaintiff to have merely
a grievance common to the public at large. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-
[Vol. 12
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that the litigation, if successful, will likely provide him with the relief
sought.2 °
The standing rules framed by the Supreme Court in Warth v. Sel-
din2 require that the plaintiff allege "specific, concrete facts demon-
strating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he personally
would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention. '2 2 In
order to give effect to this requirement, the Ninth Circuit, in Bowker v.
Morton,2 3 developed a three-part test for standing under which "the
plaintiffs must have alleged (a) a particularized injury (b) concretely
and demonstrably resulting from defendants' action (c) which injury
will be redressed by the remedy sought."'24
In De La Cruz v. Tormey,25 the court applied the Bowker test to alle-
gations that plaintiffs had been injured by defendant college district's
refusal to provide child-care facilities. The plaintiffs included one high
school student who wished to attend college in the future26 and three
college students currently attending classes in the district. Reasoning
77 (1974); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). The harm alleged need not be
economic. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 685-86 (1973) (sufficient to allege direct
harm to plaintiffs in their use of the natural resources of the region); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) ("Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-
being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society .... But the 'injury in
fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party
seeking review be himself among the injured.").
Another aspect of the standing requirement, which was not considered by the Ninth Cir-
cuit during the survey period, is the ability of one who is injured to assert the rights of third
parties. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (doctor permitted to
assert the constitutional rights of his patients in a criminal prosecution involving contracep-
tives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925) (parochial school permitted to
assert the constitutional rights of students in a suit attacking a statute requiring public edu-
cation for all children).
For a further discussion of the standing doctrine, see Wolff, Standing to Sue. Capricious
Application of Direct Injury Standard, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 663 (1976); Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1973); Monaghan, Constitu-
tional4dudication: The Who and hen, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973).
20. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). In Simon, several
organizations and individuals challenged a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service which
granted charitable tax exemptions to non-profit hospitals that did not offer free or reduced
cost service to the poor. The Court held that they had not alleged specific injury.
21. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The individual plaintiffs in Warth, low and moderate income
members of certain racial minorities, were held to have no standing to challenge an alleg-
edly discriminatory zoning law. Although the law was assumed to prohibit the building of
low and moderate cost multi-family residences in the town, the Court found no indicatioi
that plaintiffs could afford such dwellings even if built. Id. at 494-95, 502, 506-07.
22. Id. at 508 (emphasis in original).
23. 541 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 1349.
25. 582 F.2d 45, 62 (9th Cir. 1978). See also text accompanying notes 339-60 infra.
26, By the time of the appellate decision plaintiff had acquired her high school
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4WIREVIEVW [
that the high school student had suffered a "particular injury" by being
denied access to higher education, the court held that she had sufficient
standing to sue.27 Additionally, the three undergraduate plaintiffs also
were found to have satisfied the standing requirement--even though
they were receiving.a college education and had made alternative ar-
rangements for child care during school hours. The court reached this
conclusion after noting that these plaintiffs still "alleged burdens and
uncertainties they claim to suffer as a result of the challenged policy."
28
In C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson,29 the plaintiffs challenged a stat-
ute prohibiting corporate participation in nonpartisan elections. The
defendant argued that plaintiff corporations lacked standing since they,
as corporations, had no first amendment rights to assert.30 The Ninth
Circuit summarily rejected this argument by noting that the Supreme
Court, in First National Bank v. Bellotti,31 had recently disposed of a
similar contention.32
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court suggested that the freedom of speech
issue had been improperly posed. "The proper question . . . is not
whether corporations have First Amendment rights and, if so, whether
they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the ques-
tion must be whether. . . [the challenged statute] abridges expression
that the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it
does."33 Reasoning further that the first amendment would protect
noncorporate plaintiffs who wished to comment on similar ballot is-
sues, the Bellotti Court concluded that speech protected by the first
amendment does not lose its protection simply because the speaker is a
corporation.34 Thus, an interest in preserving the integrity of the elec-
toral process will not justify the infringement of a corporation's right to
speech absent the showing of a "more imminent danger to the public
interest. ' 35 The Court also noted that the legislature may not dictate
"the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who
equivalency diploma and claimed she could not attend college because of the lack of avail-
able child care. 582 F.2d at 62 n.17.
27. Id. at 62.
28. Id.
29. 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978).
30. The reasoning of the court involved, in part, a discussion of the type of first amend-
ment protection to be granted to commercial speech. Id. at 423. See text accompanying
notes 76-85 infra.
31. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
32. 583 F.2d at 423.
33. 435 U.S. at 776.
34. Id. at 781-84.
35. Id. at 788-92.
Vol. 12
19791 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SURVEY
may address a public issue. ' 36
B. Abstention
When issues presented by the litigants depend on unsettled questions
of state law, the federal court may choose to abstain from the decision-
making process until the state court has resolved the contested state
questions.37 This procedure, known as "Pullman-type" abstention, 8
has two primary goals: authoritative answers to state questions (rather
than forecasts of state interpretation), and possible avoidance of consti-
tutional issues.39
Since abstention merely involves the postponement, rather than the
abdication, of federal jurisdiction,4" the federal court should retain ju-
risdiction of the federal issues pending the outcome of the state court
proceedings.41 In such a situation the court may grant any interim re-
lief needed to protect the plaintiff during the period of abstention.
4 2
The Ninth Circuit invoked the abstention doctrine in Sederquist v.
36. Id. at 785.
37. See 17 WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 4241, at 433; Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 590 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FIELD].
38. The traditional abstention doctrine had its genesis in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). It has been asserted that other forms of abstention have at times
been invoked to avoid decisions which would needlessly conflict with state activity, to permit
states to resolve unsettled questions of state law, and to ease the congestion of federal court
dockets. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 437 n.12 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 52 (2d ed. 1970)). Additionally, the special nature of eminent domain proceed-
ings, combined with difficulties in ascertaining the state law, may permit abstention even
though neither circumstance individually would suffice. See Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
39. 17 WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 4241, at 433. The federal court often invokes Pullman-
type abstention in cases where individuals attack state statutes as being violations of their
civil liberties. FIELD, supra note 37, at 602 n.52.
40. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467, 469
(1973) (per curiam) (dismissal to permit a state court to pass on an issue of state law must be
without prejudice); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417
(1964) (a party has the right to return to district court following state court action unless he
foregoes this right by freely submitting his federal claims to state court for decision); Harri-
son v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959) (district court instructed to retain jurisdiction while
plaintiffs sought construction of state statutes in state court).
41. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967); Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485, 487 (1956).
42. See, e.g., Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389, 1398-99 (S.D. Cal. 1970) (dis-
trict court issued temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo while plaintiff
sought state court resolution); Sherwood v. Bradford, 246 F. Supp. 550, 552 (S.D. Cal. 1965)
(district court permitted temporary restraining order to remain in effect while plaintiffs ex-
hausted administrative remedies).
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City of Tiburon.43 Plaintiffs contended that the city's general land use
plans constituted a taking of their property within the meaning of the
fifth amendment.' The court used a three-pronged test to determine
whether the requirements of the Pullman doctrine had been satisfied.45
The court declared that the Pullman doctrine may be invoked where:
(1) the issue involves a sensitive area of social policy of a type which
the federal courts should resolve only when there is no alternative
means of adjudication available; (2) a constitutional adjudication can
be avoided by a definitive ruling on the state issue; and (3) the state
issue is of doubtful resolution. Examination and assessment of these
three factors enable the court to determine whether the benefits of an
appropriate resolution in state court outweigh the burden suffered by
the plaintiff in instituting a separate action in state court.
46
In evaluating the district court's decision to abstain, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Sederquist relied on Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna
Beach,47 a case in which the decision of the district court to abstain was
affirmed. In both cases, the court reviewed the great complexity and
recent character of the numerous California land use statutes, 48 con-
cluding that land use planning indeed involved a "sensitive area of so-
cial policy." The first prong of the analysis was thus satisfied.
The court next determined whether the constitutional issue could be
avoided through abstention.49 It noted the similarity between the fifth
43. 590 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1978).
44. Id. at 279-80. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be. . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
45. 590 F.2d at 281. The test was first formulated by the Ninth Circuit in Canton v.
Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1974), and it was applied in
Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1976).
46. 590 F.2d at 281. See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943)
(difficulty in determining state law is not by itself a sufficient reason for the federal court to
abstain).
47. 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976). The complaint in Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. alleged
that the imposition by the municipality of a moratorium on development, and the adoption
of an interim open-space element in the city's general plan, denied the land owner equal
protection and due process of law and constituted a taking of property without just compen-
sation. In that case, the district court's decision to abstain was affirmed. The court in
Sederquist cited extensively to the Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. decision.
48. 590 F.2d at 281-82; Rancho Palos Verdes Corp., 547 F.2d at 1095. The federal court
was concerned about the possible stifling of innovative steps which the state might take in
attempting to solve the complex problems associated with land use.
49. Although it did not reach the merits of the underlying conflict, the court indicated that
the enactment of a general plan for development of an area which specifies potential public
uses of privately owned land does not amount to inverse condemnation of that land. See
[Vol. 12
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amendment and the California constitutional prohibition against un-
compensated takings,5 0 and concluded that a resolution under state
constitutional grounds would obviate the necessity of deciding the fed-
eral question.
Finally, the court reviewed the status of the state law.5 Because the
California Supreme Court in HFH, Ltd v. Superior Court5 2 had specifi-
cally declined to decide "the question of entitlement to compensation
in the event a zoning regulation forbade substantially all use of the
land in question,"53 the resolution of the state issue was uncertain. The
appellate court thus concluded that the three-pronged test had been





"Fundamental rights" are those interests identified by the Supreme
Court as demanding special protection." This category of protected
also Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119, 514 P.2d 111, 117,
109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805 (1975) (discussing the cause of action for inverse condemnation).
50. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 states in pertinent part: "Private property may be taken or
damaged for public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived,
has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner."
51. 590 F.2d at 282-83.
52. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976).
53. Id. at 518 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244 n.16, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.16 (emphasis in original).
54. 590 F.2d at 282-83. The court concluded that although the plaintiff would be bur-
dened as a result of the abstention, the burden was not substantial enough to render the
district court's action improper. It was observed that the appropriate state proceedings had
been commenced within the statutory period, and the federal court had retained jurisdiction
over any federal questions that might remain after the conclusion of the state court proceed-
ings. Id.
55. It has also been suggested that extraordinary constitutional protection is warranted in
areas with potential for "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities." United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This principle is discussed in Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: -4 Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933 (1973).
For discussion of the standards of review employed by the Supreme Court, see Nowak,
Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neu-
tral, and Permissive Class//cations, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court,
the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equalty, 61 VA. L. REV.
945 (1975).
In holding that education is not a fundamental right, the Supreme Court succinctly de-
scribed the process of review generally followed in equal protection cases:
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates
to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explic-
itly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
rights has grown to include the right to privacy,5 6 the right to interstate
travel,57 the right to freedom of association,5" the right of access to the
criminal justice system,59 and the right to vote.6 °
The practical consequence of designating an interest as "fundamen-
tal" is that the courts must strictly scrutinize those laws or governmen-
tal practices which infringe upon the exercise of such rights. In order
for the restriction to withstand such scrutiny, the state must demon-
strate both that the challenged practice is justified by a compelling state
interest and that there exists no less intrusive method of furthering that
interest.6 '
The Supreme Court has held that because
the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringe-
ment of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized .... '[T]he political franchise of voting. . . [is] a fundamen-
tal political right, because preservative of all rights.'62
In spite of the characterization of voting as a fundamental right, how-
ever, courts have not applied the strict scrutiny test consistently in cases
involving infringements upon that right.63
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, ar-
ticulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (Texas school financing plan
held not to operate to disadvantage of a suspect class, nor to infringe on fundamental rights).
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy falls within penumbra
of guarantees found in Bill of Rights).
57. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (although not mentioned in Con-
stitution, right to interstate travel is fundamental).
58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
59. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). But C Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-
16 (1974) (indigent criminal defendant does not have a right to state-appointed counsel on
discretionary appeal to state supreme court).
60. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Other important interests have not
been elevated to the level of fundamental rights. See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1972) (welfare).
In Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc., 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978), the right of admission to a
zoo was held not to be a fundamental right. The zoo was therefore permitted to charge $14
for a single membership and $18 for a dual membership (granted to two adults living in the
same household) because there was a rational basis for the difference in cost of membership.
Id. at 1069.
61. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (over-
coming the "compelling state interest" test "demands nothing less than perfection").
62. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886)).
63. For a discussion of the confusion surrounding the determination of the appropriate
test, see Comment, A Case Study in Equal Protection: Voting Rights Decisions and a Pleafor
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1. Access to the Ballot
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the difficulty in determining the ap-
propriate test to apply to restrictions upon franchise rights in Socialist
Workers Party v. Eu. 64 While the exclusion of certain classes of voters
will be found to substantially burden the right to vote,65 the Supreme
Court in Bullock v. Carter6 6 indicated that some burdens on the exer-
cise of voting rights might not be subject to a "stringent standard of
review."67 Cases considering a candidate's right to a place on the ballot
are more likely to be evaluated on the basis of a less-demanding stan-
dard than are cases limiting the right of a voter to cast his ballot.68 In
such situations the state is attempting to balance the public's interest in
having an opportunity to vote for a candidate closely approximating
Consistency, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 934 (1976); Comment, Equal Protection: Analyzing the
Dimensions of a Fundamental Right-The Right to Vote, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 163
(1977); Note, Adams v. Askew: The Right to Vote and the Right to be a Candi-
date-Analogous or Incongruous Rights?, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 243 (1976).
Professor Gunther suggests that the Court avoid the standard of scrutiny analysis and
focus instead on the factual nexus between the law and the state's interest. Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972).
64. 591 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1978). The Eu court explained that
[t]he methodology of the Supreme Court in analyzing statutes affecting voting rights to
determine their constitutionality is not easily discerned .... As we read its opinions, a
statute may impose more than insubstantial burdens on constitutionally-protected vot-
ing rights before a close scrutiny standard is required .... An insubstantial impinge-
ment on a "fundamental right" should be scrutinized no more closely than a substantial
burden on a "not fundamental right."
Id. at 1261 n.5.
65. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (state residency requirement of one
year not necessary to promote any compelling state interest); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (annual poll tax of $1.50 or less invalid); Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (denial to military personnel of right to vote invalid); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (apportionment of legislative districts must comply with one
person, one vote requirement).
66. 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (when a regulation appreciably impacts the right to vote, it
must be strictly scrutinized).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 786 (1974) (55-day period for circu-
lating supplemental petitions not unduly burdensome); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)
(conditioning ballot position for independent candidate on affiliation with a qualified politi-
cal party held a valid means of assuring the integrity of election process); Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709 (1974) (statute denying indigents access to the ballot through the use of filing
fees invalid for lack of a reasonable relationship to state's legitimate interest in election
process); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (statute requiring independent candi-
dates to obtain signatures of 5% of voters by June of election year held valid; Court did not
indicate the test that was used). But cf Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (filing fees for
party primary elections ranging up to $8,900 held invalid); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
31 (1968) (compelling state interest test used to invalidate statute requiring independent
presidential candidates to obtain signatures of 15% of voters by February of election year).
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individual views against the state's interest in attempting to provide the
electorate with a ballot that can be understood, that will promote com-
promise, and that will maintain political stability.69
The plaintiffs in Eu sought to invalidate a section of the California
Elections Code7 ' which requires candidates qualifying for the ballot by
means of the independent petition procedure to be identified on the
ballot by the term "Independent."' 71 The court was unable to cite any
authority holding that "candidates have a right to have specific infor-
mation identifying their associates placed on the ballot, '72 and con-
cluded instead that the statutory burden limiting the candidate's ability
to describe himself was insubstantial and thus permissible.73
The court noted that plaintiff had not been denied a place on the
ballot. Rather, the limitation was on the ability of the party to describe
itself.74 This was considered an insubstantial burden on the right to
vote,75 and the state was found to have a legitimate interest in regulat-
ing its electoral process.
69. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974).
70. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10210 (West 1977).
71. 591 F.2d at 1256. There are three methods by which candidates for partisan office in a
general election can receive votes. First, candidates whose political parties meet the require-
ments of CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6430 (West 1977) and who win their party's primary election
automatically are entitled to a ballot position. Second, candidates can receive votes by a
write-in campaign. Third, a candidate not associated with a party, or associated with a party
that cannot meet the requirements of CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6430 (West 1977), can attain gen-
eral ballot status by using the independent nomination procedures set forth in CAL. ELEC.
CODE §§ 6830-6920 (West Supp. 1978). 591 F.2d at 1254-55. When a candidate qualifies by
the third method, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10210 (West 1977) requires that "[i]f a candidate has
qualified for the ballot by virtue of an independent nomination, the word 'Independent'
shall be printed instead of the name of a political party ..
72. 591 F.2d at 1260.
73. Id. at 1262.
74. Id. at 1261.
75. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974) ("[S]Ubstantial burdens on the right to
vote or to associate for political purposes are constitutionally suspect and invalid under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments and under the Equal Protection Clause unless essential
to serve a compelling state interest."). The court in Eu relied on this language in concluding
that an insubstantial burden on the right to vote would not be strictly scrutinized. 591 F.2d
at 1261. The court acknowledged that the proper test to apply was not easily discernible
from the Supreme Court cases and reasoned that restricting the description of a candidate's
party on a ballot was less burdensome than other statutory restrictions on the electoral proc-
ess to which strict scrutiny apparently had not been applied. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valco, 424
U.S. 1, 23-38 (1976) (statutory limitations on contributions by individuals and groups to
candidates and authorized campaign committees sustained); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752 (1973) (statutory requirement that voters enroll in party of their choice at least 30
days before general election held not an arbitrary time limit); McDonald v. Board of Elec-
tion, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (restrictions on availability of absentee ballots were not arbitrarily
made).
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2. Corporate Contributions to Ballot Issues
In another case related to the electoral process, C & C Plywood Corp.
v. Hanson,'6 the Ninth Circuit considered the right of a corporation to
make contributions to promote or defeat ballot issues. The threshold
questions were whether corporate speech is afforded first amendment
protection and whether a corporation may assert first amendment
rights on its own behalf. Although commercial speech has in the past
been considered to be unprotected by the first amendment,77 the more
recent analysis has focused upon whether the content of the speech was
of public interest and merited first amendment protection. 78 Finding
that the commercial speech involved related to governmental issues,
79
the Hanson court concluded that the speech was entitled to first amend-
ment protection. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, various Montana
corporations and associations, that the portion of a Montana statute8°
prohibiting corporations or banks from making contributions to pro-
mote or defeat any ballot issue was unconstitutional.8"
The Ninth Circuit relied on the recent Supreme Court holding in
First National Bank v. Bellotti,82 that the rights of corporations to ex-
press their views on issues of general public interest could not be
76. 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978).
77. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (ordinance regulating distribution of
commercial advertising by handbills found to be reasonable). See generally Comment, Com-
mercial Speech and the First Amendment." An Emerging Doctrine, 5 HOFSTRA L. Rnv. 655
(1977); Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine.: New Constitu-
tional Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975).
78. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (advertising of prescription drug prices cannot be forbidden in view of interest of
consumers and society in general in free flow of commercial information). The decisions
considering commercial speech have moved gradually toward finding no distinction based
on the type of speech involved. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertis-
ing that conveys information to a potential audience is protected by the first amendment);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (meas-
ure whether commercial speech is protected by its content); Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498 (1959) (test depends upon the general public interest in the content of the
speech); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (focuses on the primary object of the
communication).
79. 583 F.2d at 423.
80. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 23-4744 (Supp. 1977) states that "[n]o corporation ...
shall pay or contribute. . . in order to aid or promote the interests, success or defeat of any
ballot issue. No person shall solicit or receive such payment or contribution from such cor-
poration."
81. Only that aspect of the Montana statute relating to ballot issues was considered; the
prohibition against corporate contributions to partisan elections remains in effect. 583 F.2d
at 425.
82. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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abridged by the state without a showing of a compelling state interest. 83
In an initiative process the corporations are seeking to influence the
electorate rather than an individual candidate. Since it is unlikely that
any political debts are created by corporate contributions in an initia-
tive campaign, the state's interest is said to be minimal.84 The state in
Hanson was not successful in asserting a sufficiently compelling reason
for the total abridgement of the first amendment rights involved."
B. Conflicts Between Free Speech Rights and Sec!fic Constitutional
Powers
1. Copyright
In two recent cases the Ninth Circuit attempted to balance the first
amendment right of free speech against the regulatory authority of the
federal government.
Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates86 involved a suit for infringe-
ment of several Disney copyrights protecting famous cartoon charac-
ters.8 The defendants claimed that the first amendment limited the
scope of the plaintiff's copyright protection.
The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging freedom of speech, or of the press."88 Yet the Copyright
Act,89 which grants an author or originator of a work the exclusive
right to publish and sell the work, was passed pursuant to the copyright
clause of the Constitution.90 This creates a paradox, as the first amend-
83. Id. at 795.
84. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 853 (2d Cir. 1974) ("The spectre of a
political debt created by a contribution to a referendum campaign is too distant to warrant
this further encroachment on First Amendment rights.").
85. The Ninth Circuit indicated that the state might be justified in regulating corporate
contributions to the initiative process by requiring specific disclosures, highly visible identifi-
cation of the source of funds in advertising, and limitations on the amounts that could be
spent. A complete prohibition of corporate contributions, however, as existed in the statute,
was overbroad. 583 F.2d at 425.
86. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
87. The characters, depicted in adult "counter-culture" comic magazines, were similar to
Disney's figures and had the same names. The themes involved, however, were markedly
different from Disney's family-oriented presentations. Id. at 753.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.10[A] (1978) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER]; Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180, 1183 (1970).
89. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides that Congress shall have power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to authors and inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
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ment and the copyright clause cannot both be followed literally.91 The
problem then is one of balancing the need of free speech against the
desire to protect the copyrighted expression of ideas. Striking this bal-
ance is necessary in order to determine what types of speech cannot be
copyrighted due to first amendment protection of speech.92 Professor
Nimmer has suggested 93 that a definitional balancing approach (as op-
posed to an ad hoc approach) be utilized to define the forms of speech
that are protected by the first amendment and the types that are not so
protected.94 As noted by Professor Nimmer, this technique has been
employed in the areas of obscenity,9
5 privacy,96 and libel.97
The reasons for preserving free speech are to allow meaningful pub-
lic dialogue, to act as a safety valve against violent acts, and to preserve
free speech as an end in itself.98 The purposes of the copyright system
are to preserve economic incentive for creators and to protect the pri-
vacy of unpublished works.99 Professor Nimmer suggests that the
proper balance lies between the first amendment protection of ideas
and the copyright protection of the expression of ideas. 10 The Ninth
Circuit has endorsed Nimmer's idea-expression line as an accommoda-
tion of the tension between free speech and copyright interests.' The
91. The literal approach of Mr. Justice Black, see, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting), has not been followed in the first amendment area.
Professor Nimmer identifies several abridgements of speech not protected by the first
amendment, including perjury in the course of a judicial proceeding, agreements in restraint
of trade in violation of the antitrust laws, fraudulent statements, and the passing of "top
secret" material by an individual to unauthorized persons. See NIMMER, supra note 88, at
§ 1.10[A].
92. For a complete discussion of the conflict between the copyright clause and the first
amendment, see NIMMER, supra note 88, at § 1.10[A]-[D]. Preliminary to a discussion of the
first amendment conflict, in Walt Disney Productions the court considered the questions of
the copyrightability of the cartoon characters and whether the defendants infringed those
copyrights. 581 F.2d at 754-58. See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (dicussion of elements necessary to establish copyright
infringement).
93. NIMMER, supra note 88, at § 1.10[B].
94. Id., § 1.10[A], at 1-66 to 1-69.
95. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1976) (citing Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
96. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
97. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-70 (1964).
98. NIMMER, supra note 88, § 1.10 [B][1], at 1-72. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
99. NIMMER, supra note 88, § 1.10[B], at 1-72.
100. Id at 1.10[B][2]. See also Chaffee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM.
L. REv. 503, 513 (1945).
101. 581 F.2d at 758-59. The Court's approach to this problem is discussed in greater
detail in Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir.
1977).
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distinction must be drawn, for example, between the political views of a
public figure, which can be considered and commented upon by all,
and the expression of those views in a speech which may be protected
by the copyright laws. 1
0 2
Once the idea-expression distinction is articulated, it becomes appar-
ent that conflict between copyright law and the first amendment is min-
imal.1
0 3
Only infrequently must a copyrightable work be limited by first
amendment considerations."°  The Ninth Circuit in Walt Disney
Productions concluded that since the defendants "could have expressed
their theme without copying Disney's protected expression," the first
amendment guarantees of free speech did not protect them from the
restrictions of the copyright law.05
2. FTC Rulings
The Ninth Circuit considered a similar conflict in Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC. 06 There the FTC issued a cease and desist order based on its
finding that Standard Oil and its advertising agency, Batten, Barton,
Durstine & Osborn, Inc. (BBD&O), had broadcast false, misleading
and deceptive advertising.0 7 The Commission's order related to "any
The Copyright Act expressly provides that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,. . . concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
102. See, e.g., Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1272
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (comedian may copyright jokes that do not involve stock situations); Public
Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444, 450 (D.D.C. 1967) (government official
may copyright speeches not concerned with official duties which were prepared and deliv-
ered on his own time and do not form part of his official duties); Holdredge v. Knight Pub.
Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921, 923 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (although facts concerning actual life of his-
toric character cannot be copyrighted, the association, arrangement and combination of
ideas and their particular form of expression may be protected).
103. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th
Cir. 1977).
104. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(public's interest in being fully informed on assassination of President Kennedy justified
historian's use of Zapruder home movies previously purchased and copyrighted by Time,
Inc.). Professor Nimmer cites the photographs of the My Lai massacre as illustrative of the
types of "news photographs" that should be protected by first amendment consideration.
NIMMER, supra note 88, § 1.10[c][2].
105. 581 F.2d at 759.
106. 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978). It should be noted that here the plaintiff did not argue
that the Commission's power was in total conflict with the first amendment, but rather that
the order as promulgated was overbroad.
107. The Commission found both defendants to be in violation of § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973).
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product" and enjoined both parties from "all advertising which creates
a misleading impression by use of tests or demonstrations or by visual
means generally."'' 08
Although the court found the Commission's conclusion that the sub-
ject advertising was misleading to be supported by the evidence, °9 it
held that the particular cease and desist order abridged petitioners'
speech in violation of the first amendment."0 The conflict here was
between the Commission's broad power to structure remedies for prac-
tices violating the Act"'I and the restraint which the Commission must
exercise when "formulating [a] remedial order which may amount to a
prior restraint on protected commercial speech." ' 2 Because the pur-
pose of the commercial speech curtailed by the order was to aid society
in the decision-making process," 3 and rigorous enforcement by the
Commission might discourage advertising without any concommitant
gain in accuracy and truthfulness," 4 the order was held to be overly
broad.
108. 577 F.2d at 660.
109. Id. at 659.
110. Id. at 663. Reasoning that Standard Oil had never been accused of false advertising,
that BBD&O had but one previous adverse FTC consent order, that there was no showing of
blatant disregard of the Act and that petitioners had made good faith attempts to eliminate
misstatements, the Ninth Circuit found the scope of the order to be overly broad and hence
modified it to refer only to advertising of the single product of this case. The court distin-
guished the facts of this case from those which previously have justified broad orders, e.g.,
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392-95 (1965) (defendant's use of three televi-
sion commercials employing deceptive techniques easily transferable to other products justi-
fied FTC cease and desist order directed at such practices with respect to any product
advertised); Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 827 (1975) (defendant's trade name, "Dollar-A-Day" was deceptive and justified an
FTC order prohibiting use of name even though customers were informed of true price
before contracting).
111. See FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957); Carter Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 498 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). Even the FTC's broad
powers must be exercised with discretion, particularly in assuring that the remedy be reason-
ably related to the unlawful practice. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394-95
(1965).
112. 577 F.2d at 662. See also Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977) (since commercial speech is not excepted from first amend-
ment protection, prior restraints on such speech can go no further than reasonably necessary
to accomplish remedial objective of preventing the violation). The reference to commercial
speech assumes that it is protected by the first amendment and also acknowledges that false
commercial speech may be prohibited. See text accompanying notes 77 & 78 supra.
113. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 362, 384 (1977) (commercial speech,
which serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decision-
making, is entitled to some first amendment protection; state may not prevent truthful news-
paper advertisement "concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services").
114. 577 F.2d at 66.
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C. Prior Restraints
1. Broadcasting
Regulations on the publication," 5 broadcast, or presentation" 6 of
general interest material curtail the right of the press and of individu-
als to free speech, but such prior restraints" 17 are not per se unconstitu-
tional." 8 There is, nevertheless, "a heavy presumption against [their]
constitutional validity.""I9 The underlying assumption is that it is pref-
erable "to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break
the law rather than to throttle them and all others beforehand."'
' 20
This principle was applied in Goldblum v. National Broadcasting
Corp._,I where the plaintiff attempted to prevent the broadcast of a
television film based on the activities of the Equity Funding Corpora-
tion. The plaintiff, a former officer of the corporation, 22 argued that
115. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (trial judge's order
restraining news media from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions or admis-
sions adduced at an open preliminary hearing was an invalid prior restraint); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (government may not interfere with editorial
process by regulations which infringe free exercise of editorial control and judgment); Asso-
ciates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971) (injunction prevent-
ing Los Angeles Times from modifying advertising copy prior to acceptance for publication
invalid).
116. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (rejection of
application to use public auditorium for presentations of theatrical "Hair" was unlawful
prior restraint); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (ordinance conferring
upon city commission virtually absolute power to .prohibit parades, processions or demon-
strations on streets or public ways held unconstitutional since ordinance lacked narrow, ob-
jective and definite guidelines).
117. For a discussion of the application of the doctrine of prior restraints to laws and
regulations governing other activities, see Murphy, The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the
Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 898 (1976).
118. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963).
119. Id. at 70. The Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (state
statutory censorship scheme invalidated as failing to provide adequate protection against
undue inhibition of protected expression), listed three safeguards that must be provided if a
system of prior restraints is to be constitutional: (I) the censor must have the burden of
instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the material is unprotected; (2) the restraint
may be imposed prior to judicial review for only a brief period and only to preserve the
status quo; and (3) there must be a prompt judicial determination. Id. at 58-59. The Freed-
man Court differentiated films from other forms of expression, noting that because most
films are available long before scheduled exhibition, a requirement of prior submission to a
censor is less burdensome than in other media.
120. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (emphasis in
original).
121. 584 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1978).
122. Id. at 905-06. Although Goldblum's name and that of Equity Funding Corporation
were used in the "docu drama," Goldblum alleged that the presentation was a fictionalized
treatment of the subject.
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the film would retard his chances for parole and would erode his right
to an impartial jury trial in possible future criminal or civil actions in-
volving the corporation.' 23 The district judge ordered that the film be
produced in court to be viewed for "inaccuracies."'' 24 NBC refused to
produce the film, and the court of appeals convened to consider the
company's "Emergency Petition for Mandamus."'' 25
The court recognized that the press may be required to justify or
defend what it says only after the expression has occurred 126 and found
that the district court had interfered with the editorial process by re-
quiring pre-broadcast censorship. This constituted an invalid prior re-
straint that served to chill speech and threaten expression.127 The order
to produce the film was therefore vacated.
2. Military
The members of the military, while certainly not excluded from the
free speech guarantees of the first amendment, are often subject to a
different application of its protection. 28 Additional controls have been
justified both to preserve discipline and order 29 and to control speech
which threatens proper civilian control of the military. 30 In the area of
discipline and order particularly, the military has sought to diminish
123. Id. at 905.
124. The complaint requesting injunctive relief was brought little more than 24 hours
before the scheduled telecast. Id.
125. Id. Counsel for NBC had been ordered imprisoned by the district court judge for
contempt until he provided the court with the fil.
126. Id. at 907. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute permitting abate-
ment, as a public nuisance, of malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspapers,
magazines and periodicals declared an unconstitutional prior restraint).
127. 584 F.2d at 907.
128. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See generally Zillman, Free Speech and
Military Command, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 423.
129. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (refusal of physician to follow orders to
establish training program, making public statements urging Negro enlisted men to disobey
orders to go to Viet Nam); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (collecting
signatures for a petition in a military combat zone; field commander's decision to suppress
public speech in a combat zone virtually unreviewable); Dash v. Commanding General, 307
F. Supp. 849, 851 (D.S.C. 1969), a ffidper curiam, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 981 (1971) (fighting, disobedience of officers, and loss of disciplinary control re-
sulted from speech); United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 45 C.M.R. 338 (1972) (convic-
tion for publication of underground newspaper urging disobedience).
130. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (this country has a tradition of civilian
control of a military which is politically neutral).
Both the civilian and military population have been subject to controls for reasons of
security. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (while the
government has the power to preserve government secrets, this action to enjoin publication
of the Pentagon Papers was improper).
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the problem by the prior restraint of speech. 13' Many military regula-
tions exist, for instance, to limit the distribution of published material
both on and off base by requiring prior administrative review.1
32
In Allen v. Monger33 and Glines v. Wade, 134 the Ninth Circuit invali-
dated, as prior restraints on free speech, regulations restricting the
rights of military personnel to circulate petitions to be sent to govern-
ment officials. The court in Allen considered the extent to which a
prior restraint limited a statutory right. 135 Congress enacted section
1034 of the Armed Forces Act 136 to guarantee the right of members of
the armed forces to communicate with the members of Congress.
When crew members of the U.S.S. Hancock and Midway attempted to
gain signatures for a petition to their Congressmen 37 they were re-
quired to seek the prior approval of the commanding officer.' 38 The
Ninth Circuit found that the petitions were clearly within the protec-
tion of section 1034 and that only compelling reasons of national secur-
ity would permit prior restraints in these situations. 3  Thus although
military regulations requiring prior approval for distribution of politi-
cal materials are not per se invalid, 14 ° they require a showing of neces-
131. See Note, Prior Restraints in the Military, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1089 (1973).
132. See, e.g., Naval Instruction 1620.1 which requires prior approval for the distribution
of printed materials; permission may be denied by the commander if the materials present
"a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morals of military personnel" or if the distribu-
tion "would materially interfere with the accomplishment of a military mission." See also
text of Air Force regulation 30-1(9) set out in note 143 infra.
133. 583 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1978).
134. 586 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1978).
135. 583 F.2d at 440. Because the rights of the military personnel were protected by a
statute, see note 136 infra, the court did not reach the question of how the prior restraint
impacted on the constitutional right to free speech.
136. 10 U.S.C. § 1034 (1975) provides: "No person may restrict any member of an armed
force in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the communication is unlawful
or violates a regulation necessary to the security of the United States." See 583 F.2d at 440-
41.
137. The petition circulated on the Hancock questioned the necessity of making another
West Pacific cruise; the U.S.S. Midway petition opposed a change in home ports. 583 F.2d
at 439 nn. I & 2.
138. Both ships had instructions based on Naval Instruction 1620.1. See note 132 supra.
139. 583 F.2d at 442. In Huffv. Secretary of Navy, 413 F. Supp. 863 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the
court distinguished between on-base and off-base petitioning. It held regulations requiring
prior approval of on-base distribution to be unconstitutional and a violation of § 1034. It
applied a different standard, however, to off-base petitioning in a foreign country. Prior
approval was held to be reasonable in view of an international agreement restricting politi-
cal activities. Id. at 870.
140. E.g., Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dangers to disci-
pline and morale in combat zone justified prior approval requirement for circulation of peti-
tions).
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sity not present in this case. 141
The court in Glines considered whether the prior approval require-
ment abridged plaintiff's first amendment right to free speech; the pro-
tections of section 1034 did not apply to petitions addressed to the
Secretary of Defense. 142 An Air Force regulation specifically required
prior authorization by the base commander to collect signatures on a
petition. 143 Although such a regulation clearly would be unconstitu-
tional if applied to the general public,'" "[s]peech that is protected in
the civil population may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness of re-
sponse to command. If it does, it is constitutionally unprotected."'
145
Thus, although the military may on occasion justify restrictions on
speech, the Air Force regulation in question was held to be unconstitu-
tionally overbroad.146 Less restrictive alternatives were available to the
Air Force in Glines in the form of time and place restrictions, for exam-
ple, which would have adequately met the military need for obedience
and discipline. 47
141. 583 F.2d at 442.
142. 586 F.2d at 679.
143. The regulation evaluated by the Ninth Circuit provides:
9. Right of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependents and civilian employ-
ees have the right, in common with all other citizens, to petition the President, the Con-
gress or other public officials. However, the public solicitation or collection of
signatures on a petition by any person within an Air Force facility or by a member
when in uniform or when in a foreign country is prohibited unless first authorized by
the commander.
586 F.2d at 677 n.2 (quoting AFR 30-1(9)).
144. The opinion in Glines placed heavy reliance on cases involving prohibitions against
prior restraints of civilians, emphasizing the critical nature of this protection. See, e.g., Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (prior restraints on speech and publi-
cation are most serious and least tolerable infringement as first amendment rights); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (imposition of prior
restraint carries "heavy burden" of justification); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717
(1931) (liberty of the press originally intended to prevent previous restraints on publication).
145. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (quoting United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A.
564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972)).
146. 586 F.2d at 681. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Air Force regulation dealt with
"protected expression" and was "valid, if at all, only in the limited setting of the combat
zone." Id.
147. Id. at 680. "The Supreme Court insists on less restrictive alternatives to prior re-
straints when they are available. . .. ." Id. (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 563-70 (1976)).




A court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant must be consistent with the defendant's rights under the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment.148 Generally, the court must
analyze two independent aspects of personal jurisdiction. 149 First, the
state in which the district court sits must have asserted personal juris-
diction over the defendant.' 50  Second, such assertion of jurisdiction
must accord with constitutional principles of due process.' 5'
Since California's statutory exercise of jurisdiction15z has been inter-
preted to be "coextensive with the outer limits of due process,"'' 53 an
analysis of California jurisdiction focuses on those limits. 5 4 The start-
ing point is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 5 - in which the Court
stated the basic rule that the defendant must have certain minimal con-
tacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'
'5 6
148. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Court has stated:
[W]hether due process is satisfied must depend ... upon the quality of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
Id. at 319.
149. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977);
Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1977); Product
Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 1974); Arrowsmith v. United Press
Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir. 1963).
150. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
151. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
152. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) provides: "A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the
United States."
153. Threlkeld v. Tucker, 496 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023
(1974).
154. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir.
1977); Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Engr's, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 167 (9th Cir. 1975).
155. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
156. Id. at 316, 320. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (unilateral act by the
settlor of a trust which had been created in another state did not subject the trustee to per-
sonal jurisdiction in the settlor's new state of domicile); McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (solicitation of insured and subsequent sale of single policy consti-
tuted sufficient contacts to permit exercise of jurisdiction over foreign insurance company in
suit arising under the policy); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)
(foreign corporation carrying on continuous and systematic activity in a state could be sub-
jected to jurisdiction on a cause of action arising outside the state and unrelated to the
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A defendant may be subject to either the general or the specific juris-
diction of the court. General jurisdiction exists when the defendant's
contacts with the forum state have been "substantial . . . continuous
and systematic.' ' 57 In such a case, the court may exercise jurisdiction
over all causes of action, whether or not "the specific cause of action
alleged be connected with the defendant's business relationship to the
forum." 1
5 8
Subjecting a defendant to the jurisdiction of the court for a specific
cause of action requires an evaluation of the "quality and nature of his
activity in the forum in relation to the particular cause of action."
159
The Ninth Circuit has identified three factors which should be consid-
ered in determining whether an exercise of specific jurisdiction is justi-
fied:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully
avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,
thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. (2) The claim
must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-
related activities. (3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.'
60
This approach leads the court to consider issues of reasonableness and
fairness on a case-by-case basis.
61
During 1978, the Ninth Circuit considered two cases in which the
corporation's activities in the state); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp.
Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (company selling health insurance to state residents solely
through the mail subject to state jurisdiction for failure to comply with state's "Blue Sky
Law").
157. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
158. Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 147, 545 P.2d 264, 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354
(1976).
159. Id. at 148, 545 P.2d at 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
160. Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 188 (1978)
(quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287-88 (9th Cir.
1977) (jurisdiction reasonable where defendant participated in contract negotiations in the
forum state)). See Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 789 (9th
Cir. 1977) (in an action for trademark infringement, jurisdiction was unreasonable when
plaintiffs could not show that imitations were sold in the state or to state consumers); Aane-
stad v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 521 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998
(1974) (jurisdiction unreasonable where airplane involved in accident had never been in
forum, manufacturer was not licensed to do business there and had conducted no activities
there); L.D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768, 773-75 & n.12 (9th
Cir. 1959) (jurisdiction unreasonable where defendant's forum-relatea activities were not
extensive and the cause of action arose from a contract in another state).
161. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 426 (9th Cir. 1977);
Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 290-91 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1972).
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defendant objected to the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum.'62 In
each case, the court summarily dismissed the possibility of subjecting
the defendant to general jurisdiction and concentrated, instead, on the
requirements for an exercise of specific jurisdiction.
In Forsythe v. Overmyer,'63 defendant was the sole shareholder of a
corporation which negotiated the sale and leaseback of a warehouse in
Oregon. Plaintiffs insisted that defendant personally guarantee lessee's
performance, and defendant agreed. This was a vital condition prece-
dent to plaintiffs' assent to the sale-lease agreement. Negotiation took
place by phone, telegram and mail between plaintiffs, who were in Cal-
ifornia, and defendant, who was in New York. Although the guaranty
was silent on the matter, under the terms of the lease defendant's cor-
poration agreed to subject itself to the jurisdiction of California courts.
The corporation subsequently failed to pay its rent and filed petitions
in bankruptcy.
64
After evaluating these circumstances, as well as the fact that defend-
ant had frequently visited California for purposes associated with the
performance of his corporation's obligations to ten California resi-
dents,165 the court concluded that the defendant had sufficient minimal
contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction
would be reasonable.
66
The conclusion should not be drawn, however, that an officer of a
corporation who, in the performance of his official duties, causes an
effect in the forum state will necessarily be subject to personal jurisdic-
tion in that state. 67 Furthermore, "the mere existence of the parent-
subsidiary relationship is not alone a sufficient basis for long-arm juris-
diction" over both parties when only one has forum-related activi-
ties. ' 6  The separate identities of the two parties will be observed so
long as the parent and subsidiary maintain the proper formal separa-
tion. 6
9
162. Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1978); Forsythe v.
Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 188 (1978).
163. 576 F.2d 779 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 188 (1978).
164. I1d. at 781.
165. Id. at 783 n.6.
166. id. at 784 & n.7.
167. Chem Lab Prods., Inc. v. Stepanek, 554 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1977) (president of corpo-
ration not subject to personal jurisdiction when he merely communicated, from another
state, board of director approval of corporate activity in forum state).
168. Mizokami Bros. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied,
434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
169. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (although nonresident
parent corporation completely dominated subsidiary by owning all capital stock and con-
[Vol. 12
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Church of Scientology v. Adams 7 ' was a libel action brought by the
California-based church against a Missouri newspaper publisher. The
allegedly libelous articles were published in Missouri. Approximately
0.04 percent of the newspaper's total circulation reached California;
revenues from general advertising by California companies amounted
to 2.91 percent of the total.' 7 ' The reporters did not travel to California
at any time and the article made only one reference to the California
church (a separate corporation), focusing almost exclusively on the St.
Louis Scientology office.
At the outset, the effect of the newspaper's advertising revenues was
rejected as a source ofjurisdiction. 7 2 The purpose of the advertising, it
was concluded, was to reach readers outside of California and not to
cause an effect within the forum.
An evaluation of defendant's forum-related activities in the frame-
work of a libel suit depends on "whether or not it was foreseeable that
a risk of injury by defamation would arise in the forum state."'173 In
applying the general test to the specifics of the case, the Adams court
relied on the following additional facts in reaching the conclusion that
the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable: very few copies of
the articles were distributed in the forum, 74 the topic of the articles did
not involve California activities, the articles were not aimed at Califor-
nia readers, research and writing did not take place in the state, the
church in California was a separate corporation, and there was serious
trolling it commercially and financially, adherence to such corporate formalities as keeping
separate books and recording transactions between the parent and subsidiary in the same
way as if they were two separate corporations made exercise of jurisdiction over parent
improper); Uston v. Grand Resorts, Inc., 564 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1977) (fact that parent
corporation did business in California did not result in personal jurisdiction over subsidiary
absent showing that formal separation was not scrupulously maintained); Uston v. Hilton
Casinos, Inc., 564 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1977).
170. 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978).
171. Id. at 896.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 897-98. See, e.g., Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 639-44
(9th Cir. 1967) (exercise of personal jurisdiction unreasonable where based on conduct of
defendant while filming a movie outside the forum which allegedly resulted in decreased
attendance at showing of the movie within the forum).
174. Circulation of a small number of copies in the forum state will not always result in a
finding of lack of jurisdiction. Rather, the evaluation must focus on the content and ex-
pected audience of the articles. For example, jurisdiction was held to be proper in Anselmi
v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977), where the
article concerned activity within the forum and reporters had been sent to the forum to
research and write the story, even though only an extremely small number of the newspapers
reach the forum state.
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doubt that the articles referred to the plaintiff.175
The court refused to adopt the Fifth Circuit's view that newspapers,
by reason of first amendment considerations, should be "entitled to in-
creased protection from imposition of personal jurisdiction."'' 76 Hav-
ing concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
the court found it unnecessary to reach the first amendment issue. In-
stead, the court observed "that first amendment protections are better
developed in the context of substantive defenses on the merits rather
than at the initial jurisdictional stage of a defamation proceeding.' 77
2. Necessity for State Action
The wording of the fourteenth amendment178 makes it necessary to
distinguish between private and state action in suits alleging denials of
due process or equal protection. Private conduct is not considered to
be violative of due process or equal protection unless accompanied by
significant state involvement.
1 79
There is no difficulty in finding state action in acts of state officials
(elected or appointed)'80 or employees acting within the scope of their
175. 584 F.2d at 898.
176. Id. at 899. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572-73 (5th Cir.
1966). The court in Connor held that in order to accommodate first amendment concerns,
more contacts than the requisite minimum for other tort actions are required to sustain
personal jurisdiction in defamation actions against out-of-state publishers.
177. 584 F.2d at 899.
178. The fourteenth amendment states in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
179. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (restaurant's re-
fusal to serve appellant because of race violated equal protection where restaurant was part
of public building, was built and maintained with public funds, and was operated in part by
state).
180, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (refusal of governor to permit integration of
elementary school).
Plaintiffs in Guadalupe Organization, Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022
(9th Cir. 1978), brought an action alleging that they had been denied their civil rights be-
cause the school district had failed to provide non-English speaking students with bilingual-
bicultural education. Defendants sought to have the court dismiss the suit, contending that
its failure to provide the specialized education was not action and hence could not be consid-
ered "state action." Id. at 1026. The court apparently viewed the argument as specious and
disposed of it quickly. It noted that the school district had made the affirmative choice to
cure language deficiencies by means other than a bilingual-bicultural program. "By this
exclusion it has chosen not to provide that which the appellants seek. This is state action
sufficient to merit review by a federal court to determine whether it contravenes the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id.
It would seem that the defendant confused the jurisdictional argument with the substan-
tive one. The court in Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
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executive power. 8 ' The use of the state courts to approve racially dis-
criminatory agreements has also been found to be state action. 182 Simi-
larly, state action is present when there is a state-enforced custom of
segregation, 8 3 when an individual or group performs what is tradition-
ally a function of the state, 184 and when governmental property is used
by private organizations.
85
Whether state action can be found solely from the fact that a busi-
ness activity is licensed or regulated by the state or political subdivision
is a more difficult determination. The authorization by statute of the
challenged conduct does not by itself necessarily transform private ac-
tion into state action. 8 6 There must be significant state involvement
grounds, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) held that since "the language deficiency suffered by appellants
was not caused directly or indirectly by any State action, we agree with the judgment of the
district court and distinguish this case from Brown v. Board of Education .. " The words
"State action" in Lau refer not to the activities of the school district in providing education
but rather to the reasons for the students' problems with English. This is, perhaps, the way
in which the defendant in Guadalupe should have focused on those words.
181. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (private guard who had been deputized as a
sheriff); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (trustees of a
private trust acting as an agency of the state); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)
(sheriff and policemen); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (state and local elec-
tion officials).
182. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
183. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (state-enforced custom of racial
segregation in public eating places).
184. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (pre-primary election by a private association
when the results of such election determined who would be the eventual winner in the politi-
cal subdivision); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (actions of a privately owned
"company town"); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (political party acting under stat-
utory authority controlled the outcome of an election).
See also Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (privately owned shopping center cannot ban labor-related picketing). But see Hudg-
ens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (rejecting holding and rationale in Logan, Court held
employees of a company with a retail store in a shopping center have no constitutional right
to picket there); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (privately owned shopping
center can restrict handbilling which is unrelated to any activity within the center); Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972) (Logan reasoning does not apply to the park-
ing lot of a free standing retail store).
185. Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (operation of a private restaurant at the
municipal airport); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (operation
of a private restaurant in a municipal parking structure).
186. See Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804-06 (9th Cir. 1976) (enactment of statute
pertaining to sale of goods stored in warehouse, together with regulation of the private activ-
ity, did not make the private warehouseman's lien enforcement state action). See also Cul-
bertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1975) (hotel manager's seizure under state
statute of tenants' belongings following their eviction for nonpayment of rent was state ac-
tion; the court noted that the rights asserted by the manager did not exist at common law,
that there was no contractual agreement covering the tenants' property, and that the prop-
erty seized was not that for which the debt had arisen); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l
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before the Constitution's due process protections will attach.,'87 While
there is no specific formula for determining whether a state is signifi-
cantly involved, the Ninth Circuit has enumerated six critical areas of
review: (1) whether the source of authority for the private conduct com-
plained of is common law or statute; 88 (2) whether the regulation so
pervades the private conduct as to entangle the state in the activity; 89
(3) whether the state is a joint participant in the activity or there are
mutual benefits conferred between the state and the private party;190 (4)
whether there is a relationship between the property involved and the
underlying debt; (5) whether there is a contract which provides for the
challenged action;' 9' and, (6) whether the statute represents a delega-
tion of a traditional state function.1
92
In Charmicor v. Deaner, 93 for example, plaintiffs sought to invoke
the protection of the fourteenth amendment, contending that Nevada's
nonjudicial foreclosure statute 94 transformed private foreclosure into
state action. They alleged that the statute offended both due process,
by failing to provide a pre-sale hearing, and equal protection, by dis-
criminating against plaintiff's shareholders, who were black. In dealing
Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (individual's use
of the self-help repossession provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code did not amount to
state action where seller's right to repossess automobile was explicitly set forth in written
security agreement).
187. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (granting of a liquor license
to a fraternal organization not sufficient state action).
188. A finding of a common-law origin for the action taken may be helpful in showing
that the state has not interjected itself into the activity involved. However, it is not determi-
native on the issue. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 186.
189. To some extent the state is involved in many private activities, but that alone is not
sufficient to sustain a finding of state action. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974) (licensing and regulation of a privately owned public utility not suffi-
cient state action in a suit for damages resulting from termination of electric service without
notice and hearing).
190. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961) (state a
joint participant in the operation of a restaurant located in a publicly owned and operated
building).
191. For a discussion of areas four and five, see Adams, supra note 186.
192. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). In Hall, a statute authorizing
landlords to summarily seize the personal property of tenants who defaulted in the payment
of their rent was held to be state action because this type of summary seizure has tradition-
ally been reserved to the state. This "state function" rationale has not been accepted by the
Ninth Circuit.
193. 572 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1978).
194. NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.080 (1973) provides that a trustee may exercise a power of
sale after a default upon meeting certain requirements, including notice of default, election
to sell, time to cure the default, and a waiting period of three months between recording of
notice of default and sale.
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with these contentions, the court focused on a comparison of Nevada' 95
and California 96 statutory procedures for nonjudicial foreclosures. It
found them to be sufficiently similar to permit the use of cases constru-
ing the California provisions as precedents for the Nevada statute.
97
Reasoning that the statutory source of authority for the trustee sale did
not transform a private, nonjudicial foreclosure into state action and
that any state participation was purely ministerial, the Ninth Circuit
found there to be no significant state action and, therefore, no federal
question. 98
B. Procedural Due Process
1. Introduction
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains
what process is due. It has been said so often by this Court and others
as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands." 199
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to determine what
'process was due in three distinct areas. In G-KProperties v. Redevelop-
ment Agency,2" the Ninth Circuit ruled that because the plaintiff's fail-
ure to comply with discovery orders was not the result of reasons
beyond its control, and because the facts leading to the court's dismissal
of the action demonstrated a willful refusal to comply with such discov-
ery orders, the court did not deny the plaintiff its due process rights
when it dismissed the action pursuant to rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.2° ' In Schuman v. Calfornia,°2 the Ninth Circuit
adopted the First Circuit's view that "the use of a motor vehicle is a
'liberty' interest protected by due process, 2 °3 but then affirmed that a
195. See note 194 supra.
196. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2924-2924h (West 1973).
197. 572 F.2d at 696. See Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (constru-
ing California nonjudicial foreclosure as not involving state action); U.S. Hertz, Inc. v. Nio-
brara Farms, 41 Cal. App. 3d 68, 116 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1974). Cf Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F.
Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (North Carolina's nonjudicial foreclosure statutes considered
examples of significant discretionary acts of county recorder).
198. 572 F.2d at 696. Accord Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 146 Cal. Rptr.
208, 578 P.2d 925, appeal dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 343 (1978) (state procedure for nonjudicial
foreclosure of deeds of trust on real property constitutes private, not state, action).
199. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
200. 577 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1978).
201. Id. at 647-48. For a further discussion see text accompanying notes 209-19 infra.
202. 584 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1978).
203. id. at 870. See Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748, 751 (1st Cir. 1973).
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motorist was not denied due process by the manner in which her
driver's license was revoked.2° In Sutton v. Lionel,2 °5 the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed that a Nevada bar applicant, who had been denied admis-
sion to the Nevada state bar after failing the written bar examination
and who had failed to make a timely petition for review, had not been
denied his due process rights since he had been granted "notice and
opportunity" within the fourteenth amendment due process require-
ments.
2. Dismissals Under Rule 37(b)
Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
court may dismiss an action for a party's failure to comply with an
order compelling discovery.20 6 However, such powers of dismissal are
not without limitations.20 7 For example, in Societe Internationale v.
Rogers,20 8 the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of a complaint
under rule 37(b) was improper in a situation in which the noncompli-
ance with the pretrial production order was due to an inability to com-
ply rather than any unwillingness or bad faith.
In the Ninth Circuit case of G-K Properties v. Redevelopment
Agency,20 9 an appeal was based in part upon the claim that the court's
order dismissing the action with prejudice for failure to comply with
discovery orders was an abuse of discretion and an inappropriate use of
rule 37(b).21° G-KProperties involved a suit in inverse condemnation
by G-K Properties and Genesco, Inc., as property owners, against the
redevelopment agency of-the City of San Jose. The complaint alleged
204. The Department of Motor Vehicles employees gave appellant at least three driving
skills tests, a hearing where she declined the opportunity to have counsel present, and notifi-
cation when her license was revoked. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes
220-22 infra
205. 585 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1978). For a further discussion, see notes 224-27 infra.
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) reads, in pertinent part:
Sanctions by court in which action ispending. If a party or an officer, director, or manag-
ing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 3 1(a) to testify on
behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, the court in which the action is
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others,
the following:. . . (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party. ...
207. See, e.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897) (sanctions imposed merely for punish-
ment may violate due process).
208. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
209. 577 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1978).
210. The appellants contended that the trial court's order 1) was an abuse of discretion
and 2) resulted in a taking of property without due process. 1d. at 646.
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that certain property had become unusable as the result of a redevelop-
ment project. Throughout the action, however, a crucial factual issue
was whether the property (a retail store) had been closed because of the
alleged inverse condemnation or because it had become unprofitable
for other, unrelated reasons.2 1 In order to determine this issue, the
court ordered appellant to produce any and all reports concerning
financial performance, the goals and purposes, and the nature and ex-
tent of the store's operations over a period of approximately fifteen
years. The plaintiff failed to comply with these orders vis-a-vis a sub-
stantial number of the years involved, and the trial date was continued
pursuant to the court's ordering the plaintiff either to comply with its
previous order or to file an affidavit that such reports did not exist.
212
More than three months after the court issued its order to produce the
reports, the appellees moved for dismissal as a sanction for appellants'
failure to comply with the court order. At the hearing on this motion,
the appellant revealed to the court that such reports as would comply
with the court order did, in fact, exist. However, the court refused to
accept such documents and, finding that a further continuance would
not be an effective sanction, dismissed the case with prejudice.2" 3
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that
[w]here it is determined that counsel or a party has acted willfully or in
bad faith in failing to comply with rules of discovery or with court orders
enforcing the rules or in flagrant disregard of those rules or orders, it is
within the discretion of the trial court to dismiss the action or to render
judgment by default against the party responsible for noncompliance.
214
The court found that the trial court had acted within its discretion in
dismissing the case with prejudice.2 15
Appellants relied upon the case of Societe Internationale v. Rogers2" 6
in support of their argument that the dismissal of the claim denied
211. Id. at 646-47.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 647.
214. Id.
215. The court's rationale was partially based upon the reasoning found in the Supreme
Court opinion of National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
643 (1976) (per curiam):
If the decision of the Court of Appeals remained undisturbed in this case, it might well
be that these respondents would faithfully comply with all future discovery orders en-
tered by the District Court in this case. But other parties to other lawsuits would feel
freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other discovery or-
ders of other district courts. (emphasis in original).
216. 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (plaintiff failed to comply with a court order to produce docu-
ments because such compliance would have been a violation of Swiss law, subjecting the
plaintiff to criminal prosecution).
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them their right to due process. In Societe Internationale, the Court
had held that "[r~ule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal
of [the] complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial
production order when it has been established that failure to comply
has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault
of petitioner." 217 However, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out in the case
of G-K Properties, there was "no suggestion that the appellants . . .
failed to coniply with the discovery orders because of circumstances
beyond their control."2 " Societe Internationale was therefore inappo-
site. The district court decision to dismiss with prejudice the action by
the property owners against the redevelopment agency was thus held
not to be a denial of due process, and the dismissal was affirmed.21 9
3. Revocation of Driver's License
In Schuman v. Caifornia,22° the Ninth Circuit held that the use of a
motor vehicle is a liberty interest within the meaning of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment,22' but found that, based on the
facts presented, the due process requirements had been met. The mo-
torist in Schuman was required to take and pass a driving examination.
After she failed to pass the driving test at least three times, she was
offered the opportunity to appear with counsel at a hearing to deter-
mine whether her license should be revoked for lack of skills. The mo-
torist was present at her hearing but, at her own election, was not
represented by counsel. Following the hearing, it was recommended
that her license be revoked and the motorist was so notified. The Ninth
Circuit held that such procedures comported with the requirements of
due process and that there was, therefore, no fourteenth amendment
violation.222
217. Id. at 212.
218. 577 F.2d at 648.
219. Id. at 648-49.
220. 584 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
221. In so doing the court employed the analysis of the First Circuit, citing Raper v.
Lucey, 488 F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1973) (due process extends to cover the use of a motor
vehicle in an application proceeding) and Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953) (in suspension proceeding court held freedom to use own motor
vehicle was protected by due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). Accord, Bell v.
Burson 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)("Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action
that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be
taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.")
See also note, Constitutional Law-Due Process Suspension or Revocation of a Driver's License
Without Prior Hearing Deemed Constitutionally Adequate, 54 N.D.L. REV. 274 (1977).
222. 584 F.2d at 870. See also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), which held constitu-
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4. Denial of Admission to Practice an Occupation
The Supreme Court has established that "[a] State cannot exclude a
person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a man-
ner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 223 In 1978, the Ninth Circuit
was not called upon to review any case in which the reason for a denial
to practice an occupation was at issue. However, in Sutton v. Lionel,2 24
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the scope of procedural due process re-
quired if a license to practice law is to be denied to an applicant.
In Sutton, a Nevada bar applicant did not make a timely petition for
judicial review after failing the written bar examination for a fourth
and, according to the Nevada bar rules, final time. His late petition
was denied." 5 The Nevada bar rules provide that upon notice of fail-
ure to pass a written examination, a bar applicant has the right to in-
spect his examination papers as well as the questions given and the
ratings received. Additionally, the applicant may file a petition for ju-
dicial review within sixty days of being notified of his or her denial of
admission to the practice of law.226 Sutton asserted that the refusal of
judicial review denied him his right to due process. However, the
Ninth Circuit held that since the board of examiners had acted neither
arbitrarily nor capriciously in its dealings with the applicant, the sixty
day filing rule as applied in this case was not a denial of procedural due
process.227
C Substantive Due Process-Liberty
In Board of Regents v. Roth,228 the Supreme Court held that a deci-
sion not to rehire an employee is not in itself sufficient to impose a
"stigma or other disability" that forecloses the employee's freedom to
partake of other employment opportunities. The Court stated that, "it
stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of
tional an Illinois statute providing for full administrative hearing only after the suspension
or revocation of a driver's license.
223. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
224. 585 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1978).
225. Id. at 402.
226. Id. at 401-02. Such petition must show that the applicant was prevented through
fraud, imposition or coercion from passing the written examination by the board of examin-
ers.
227. Cf. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1103 (5th Cir. 1975),\cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940
(1976) (failure to make provisions for a hearing not violative of procedural due process
where the applicant has an unqualified right to re-examination).
228. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as
before to seek another." 2 9 There is therefore no deprivation of an em-
ployee's liberty in violation of the fourteenth amendment when an em-
ployment contract is not renewed, unless the employer makes charges
which might damage the employee's reputation or otherwise interfere
with the employee's ability to obtain other employment. 30
The Ninth Circuit applied the Roth rationale in the case of Haimo-
witz v. University of Nevada.231 Haimowitz claimed, inter alia, that his
liberty had been infringed upon in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment since he had not been given tenure.232 The Ninth Circuit held
that the "lack of [any] public statements about [Haimowitz] which
[were] false, defamatory or stigmatizing in connection with termina-
tion" prevented the employee's fourteenth amendment liberty interests
from being implicated.233
The scope of the hearing required by procedural due process once a
liberty interest of a non-tenured employee is found to be at stake was
examined by the Ninth Circuit in Graves v. Duggane.234 Graves, a
teacher, had received a letter from the school board stating that the
reason her contract had not been renewed was "lack of acceptance by
the community of [her] out-of-school activities and the example which
[she was] setting for the young people of the school district with [her]
personal behavior. '235 The district court ordered that Graves be given
an opportunity to clear her name in a post-termination hearing. Ap-
plying the Supreme Court's decision in Codd v. Pegler,236 the Ninth
Circuit held that the proper scope of such a hearing was only that suffi-
cient to allow the employee to clear her name by determining whether
the allegations were true or false.2 37 Once such an opportunity has
been afforded the injured party, there can be no further claim of denial
229. Id. at at 573. But see Id. at 588-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (any denial of govern-
ment employment requires a due process hearing).
230. Id. at 573.
231. 579 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1978).
232. For a discussion of Haimowitz's other claims see notes 245-47 & 299-302 infra and
accompanying text.
233. 579 F.2d at 529 ("His sole contention is that the mere fact of non-retention was
sufficiently stigmatizing to implicate a liberty. But such a theory has not been accepted in
case law, and we refuse to accept the theory here."). See also Codd v. Vegler, 429 U.S. 624,
628 (1977) (per curiam) (only if false and defamatory impression is created and dissemi-
nated is a hearing required).
234. 581 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1978).
235. Id. at 223.
236. 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (per curiam).
237. 581 F.2d at 224. Cf. Codd v. Vegler, 429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977) (per curiam) (hear-
ing not required if employee does not challenge the substantial truth of the allegations).
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of due process on the grounds that such a hearing did not lead to the
restoration of her employment.23 Further, since there was no property
interest of the employee involved, 239 the employer could decide not to
rehire Graves in the future for other reasons or for no reason at all.
240
A non-tenured public employee cannot be removed from his position
if the dismissal is predicated on an exercise of his first amendment
rights.241' The Supreme Court dealt with this problem in the case of Mt.
Healthy City School District v. Doyle.242 The Court identified the issue
as one of "striking 'a balance between the interests of the teacher as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.' "243 The Court held that
the employee must show both that his actions were protected by the
first amendment and that the actions were a "motivating or substan-
tial" factor in the decision not to rehire. If this is shown, the employer
must then show that the decision not to rehire would have been made
notwithstanding the disputed conduct. 2'
The Ninth Circuit applied the Doyle test to Haimowitz v. University
of Nevada245 in reversing a summary judgment against the plaintiff.
The court held that since Haimowitz was never afforded the opportu-
nity to show that his constitutionally protected conduct 246 was a moti-
vating factor in his non-retention, it was improper to grant summary
judgment against him.247
In deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School District,248 the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied upon the dictum of the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of
238. 581 F.2d at 224.
239. Id.
240. Id See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (private communications between em-
ployer and employee at time of discharge cannot form the basis for a claim of deprivation of
one's liberty); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (a person is not deprived of
liberty when he is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another). See
generaly Note, Expected Continued Employment as a Protected Property Right, 22 Loy. L.
REV. 884 (1976).
241. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 275, 281-83 (1977); Haimowitz v.
University of Nev., 579 F.2d 526, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
242. 429 U.S. 275, 281-83 (1977) (teacher who was non-tenured and dismissed for, inter
alia, conveying contents of internal memo to radio media, held entitled to a hearing to
determine if non-retention would have occurred absent constitutionally protected conduct).
243. Id. at 284 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
244. 429 U.S. at 287.
245. 579 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
246. "[Tjhere seems little doubt that the speech and conduct described by Haimowitz in
his allegations was constitutionally protected." Id. at 530.
247. Id.
248. 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Education v. LaF~eur249 to rule that it was not a denial of due process to
mandate that a teacher take a leave of absence at the beginning of the
ninth month of pregnancy.5 0 In LaF/eur, the Supreme Court stated
that "[t]his court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 5 ' The
Court analyzed the fourth and fifth month mandatory pregnancy leave
policies of the Cleveland, Ohio and Chesterfield County, Virginia
school boards, respectively, to determine whether they were in viola-
tion of the due process clause. The Court reviewed the cases in the
context of two legitimate state interests which could possibly justify
such mandatory leave policies. The first state interest analyzed was the
need for "continuity of instruction. ' 252 The court concluded that
the arbitrary cutoff dates embodied in the mandatory leave rules before us
have no rational relationship to the valid state interest of preserving con-
tinuity of instruction. As long as the teachers are required to give sub-
stantial advance notice of their condition, the choice of firm dates later in
pregnancy would serve the boards' objectives just as well, while imposing
a far lesser burden on the women's exercise of constitutionally protected
freedom.253
The second state interest scrutinized was the need to keep physically
unfit teachers out of the classroom. The Court held, that even assum-
ing that some teachers become physically disabled and therefore per-
form their duties ineffectively during the latter stages of pregnancy, the
rules examined swept too broadly. 54 Such rules violated the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment since they conclusively pre-
sumed physical impairment, thus unduly penalizing a female teacher
for deciding to bear a child. 5
The instructor in deLaurier had requested permission to teach until
the onset of labor and had claimed that the district's ninth-month
mandatory leave policy was violative of fourteenth amendment due
process. The Ninth Circuit analyzed her claim with the same two-step
approach applied by the Court in LaFleur.256 The Ninth Circuit con-
sidered the state interest in continuity of instruction but held that "con-
trary to the situation in LaFleur, the districts' ninth-month rule [was]
249. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
250. 588 F.2d at 681-83.
251. 414 U.S. at 639-40.
252. Id. at 642.
253. Id. at 643.
254. Id. at 644.
255. Id. at 644, 648.
256. 588 F.2d at 681-83.
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not needless and arbitrary." '257 The court reasoned that the district ter-
minated the teacher's freedom of choice precisely at the point of great-
est unpredictability and that setting a date any later would greatly
diminish the school's ability to rely upon any firm date.258 Pursuant to
the implications of the dictum in LaFleur that the school district had
the right to establish some date for mandatory leave, the Ninth Circuit
held the San Diego district's ninth-month rule to be reasonable.
As to the "necessity of keeping physically unfit teachers out of the
classroom," the Ninth Circuit held that contrary to the case of LaFleur
"the district judge was entitled to conclude that the ninth-month mater-
nity leave policy was not condemned by the irrebuttable presumption
analysis." 259 The court reached this decision by relying on the state-
ment in LaFleur that there were exceptions to the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine. 260 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that deLaurier came
within the exception since the possibility of labor beginning in the
classroom during the ninth month increased dramatically. The Ninth
Circuit therefore held that the ninth-month maternity leave policy in
deLaurier was "outside the scope of the conclusive presumption analy-
sis.''2
1
D. Substantive Due Process-Property
1. Claims of Entitlement
a. Statutory
In its struggle to define property interests which are subject to consti-
tutional due process, the Supreme Court has held that certain govern-
257. Id. at 682.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 683. "Although no Supreme Court decision has formally overruled LaF/eur or
other 'irrebuttable presumption' decisions, it is apparent that the use of the doctrine has been
severely limited." Id. at 683 n.16.
260. Id. at 682. The LaF/eur Court addressed itself to the exceptions to the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine.
We are not dealing in these cases with maternity leave regulations requiring a termina-
tion of employment at some firm date during the last few weeks of pregnancy. We
therefore have no occasion to decide whether such regulations might be justified by
considerations not presented in these records-for example, widespread medical con-
sensus about the 'disabling' effect of pregnancy on a teacher's job performance during
these latter days, or evidence showing that such firm cutoffs were the only reasonable
method of avoiding the possibility of labor beginning while some teacher was in the
classroom, or proof that adequate substitutes could not be procured without at least
some minimal lead time and certainty as to the dates upon which their employment was
to begin.
414 U.S. at 647 n.13.
261. 588 F.2d at 683.
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mental benefits to which recipients have a "statutory entitlement"
constitute one such form of property.262 While the Court has yet to
define a "statutory entitlement," it has stated that the determination
turns on a finding of whether one has a mere "unilateral expectation"
or a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the benefit. 263 The Court has
further stated that the grounds for such distinction can be found in the
independent source creating the interest rather than in the Constitu-
tion.26
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit reviewed several cases which required a
finding of whether a constitutionally protected "property" interest was
involved. In Moore v. Johnson26' and in City of Santa Clara v. An-
drus,26 6 the court was required to distinguish between mere "unilateral
expectations" and those "statutory entitlements" which form a type of
property within the meaning of the due process clause.267
The complaint in Moore v. Johnson268 arose out of the relocation of
certain veterans from a Veterans Administration facility. The plaintiffs
alleged that such relocation without a prior hearing was a denial of due
process and that the post-relocation hearing that was afforded was de-
fective. The Ninth Circuit held that even if the complaint was viewed
as a constitutional challenge to the veterans' benefits legislation 269 as
opposed to a challenge to the Administrator's discretionary decision,2
the plaintiffs had no "property" or "liberty" interest protected by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
As the Supreme Court stated in Board of Regents v. Roth,272 property
262. The Court has, however, defined certain benefits as "statutory entitlements" deserv-
ing of the protections of the due process clause. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
(public education); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (dictum) (tenured public
employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare payments).
263. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
264. Id See Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property. Federal Common Law and
Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 355, 359 (1978).
265. 582 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1978).
266. 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 177 (1978).
267. In other cases, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the issue of whether non-tenured public
employees have any "property" or "liberty" interests within the meaning of the due process
clause. See text accompanying notes 299-304 infra.
268. 582 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1978).
269. 38 U.S.C. §§ 601-628 (1976).
270. The court was in doubt as to whether to regard the complaint as a constitutional
challenge to an Act of Congress or as a challenge to the decision of the Veteran's Adminis-
trator, and therefore dealt with both possibilities. The court found that if the complaint
were a challenge to the Administrator's decision, the plaintiffs could be denied judicial re-
view under 38 U.S.C. § 21 l(a) (1976). 582 F.2d at 1232.
271. Id. at 1233-34.
272. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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interests are "created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source. '2 73 The
Ninth Circuit therefore looked to 38 U.S.C. section 610274 as the source
of the plaintiffs' interests. It held that the plaintiffs had a mere unilat-
eral expectation in their choice of a facility which did not rise to the
level of a property interest.275 In so ruling the court noted that 38
U.S.C. section 610 provides the administrator with a great deal of flex-
ibility in determining "the use to which the Administration's facilities
are to be put. ' 276 Since the statute grants the administrator such wide
discretion in his decision whether to provide the benefits which the
plaintiffs were receiving, it certainly could not be read as granting the
recipients a "legitimate claim to entitlement" to particular benefits at a
specific facility.
277
The court's reasoning in characterizing these interests as mere unilat-
eral expectations as opposed to statutory entitlements is sound. How-
ever, when the court further supported its position by declaring that the
burden of relocation was "not of the magnitude that commends a con-
stitutional response ... ,27 it confused the process of determining
the form of hearing required by the due process clause with the issue of
whether the requirements of due process were applicable at all.27 9 The
dictum of the court regarding the burden of relocation is relevant, then,
only to the procedures that would have been required by due process
and not to whether the interests involved are "property" interests pro-
tected by the due process clause.
In City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 280 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a
claim by the city of Santa Clara that it had a statutory entitlement to
receive, and therefore a property interest in, low-cost hydroelectric
power generated by the Central Valley Project in California. The
source of such a claim of entitlement was the Reclamation Project Act
273. Id. at 577.
274. 38 U.S.C. § 610 (1976) ("Eligibility for hospital, nursing home, domiciliary care...
(b) The Administrator, within the limits of Veterans' Administration facilities, may furnish
domiciliary care to ...." (emphasis added)).
275. 582 F.2d at 1233.
276. Id. at 1234.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972):
A weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing
required in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine whether
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the "weight" but
to the nature of the interest at stake.
Id. at 570-71 (emphasis in original).
280. 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 177 (1978).
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of 1939,281 under which the Secretary of the Interior is required to give
a preference to public entities over private entities "in the marketing of
power generated by federal reclamation projects.
282
The court construed the applicable source of the interest at stake to
be a preference for public entities over private parties in the Secretary
of the Interior's decision as to the allocation of such power. Since the
Ninth Circuit had previously held in Arizona Power Pooling Association
v. Morton283 that such a preference clause constituted a requirement
that the Secretary so act,28 4 the court held that this particular prefer-
ence constituted a statutory entitlement on the part of the city of Santa
Clara which was protected by the due process clause.285
With regard to any preference over other public entities, however,
the court ruled that Santa Clara had no legitimate claim to entitlement.
Under the Act, the Secretary is not directed as to the method of alloca-
tion among the public entities, and is given such wide discretion as
would allow the Secretary "[if] he chooses . . . [to] . . . market all
available CVP power to a single public entity without running afoul of
the preference clause. ' 286 The court reasoned that the rationale of
Board of Regents v. Roth287 was applicable in that the decision-makers
in each case (the school board and the Secretary of the Interior) had
such unbridled discretion that reasons were not required to justify a
decision whether to bestow a benefit upon the potential recipient.
Thus, the plaintiff in City of Santa Clara v. Andrus had no statutory
entitlement to a preference over other public entities; rather, it pos-
sessed a mere abstract concern in receiving a part of the allotment of
power made to all public entities.288
In both Moore v. Johnson and City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, the
Ninth Circuit defined "statutory entitlement" in the negative. Both
cases hold that statutes which give an administrator complete discretion
over the choice of recipient of statutory benefits create mere unilateral
281. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1964) reads in pertinent part: "Provided further, that in said
sales or leases [of electric power] preference shall be given to municipalities and other public
corporations or agencies. . . ." (emphasis added).
282. 572 F.2d at 667. See Arizona Power Pooling Ass'n v. Morton, 527 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
283. 527 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
284. Id. at 727 ("The preference clause clearly calls for the Secretary to defer to the stated
congressional objective of offering the government's excess power allotment to public enti-
ties first, subject only to considerations of overall project efficiency. . ....
285. 572 F.2d at 667.
286. Id.
287. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
288. 572 F.2d at 675-76.
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expectations and cannot create the type of statutory entitlements pro-
tected as "property" interests under the due process clause. 289 In City of
Santa Clara v. Andrus the Ninth Circuit further stated that a protected
"property" interest is created when an administrator is required to fol-
low a specific statutory directive as to the distribution of a benefit.29°
b. Non-Statutory
In Board of Regents v. Roth,2 9 ' the Supreme Court held that a profes-
sor who had been hired for a fixed term, without tenure, had no prop-
erty right within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment due process
clause to continued employment. The Court found that any such prop-
erty interest in continued employment "was created and defined by the
terms of his appointment."292 Since those terms specifically provided
for a particular termination date and did not contain a provision for
renewal, the Court held that Roth had only an "abstract concern in
being rehired, but he did not have a property interest sufficient to re-
quire the University authorities to give him a hearing when they de-
clined to renew his contract of employment."
293
However, in Perry v. Sindermann,294 the companion case to Roth, the
Court recognized that there are exceptions to the general rule that only
a written contract with explicit tenure provisions gives rise to a prop-
erty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. This exception
occurs when officials act in such a manner as to give rise to a reason-
able expectation of continued employment. As the Court stated in
Perry:
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly is evidence of
a formal understanding that supports a teacher's claim of entitlement to
continued employment unless sufficient "cause" is shown. Yet absence of
such an explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose the possi-
bility that a teacher has a "property" interest in re-employment. For ex-
ample, the law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has
289. See also Note, Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Proper y, 86 YALE L. REV.
695, 704 (1977).
290. 572 F.2d at 676-77.
291. 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (teacher hired with one year employment contract, the
terms of which "secured absolutely no interest" in continued employment, did not have a
sufficient property interest to require a hearing when he was not rehired).
292. Id. at 578.
293. Id. (emphasis in original).
294. 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (teacher who had been employed in the Texas state
college system for ten years under a continuous series of one year contracts which did not
have tenure provisions was entitled to a hearing on his claim of having a property interest in
continued employment when he was not offered a contract for an eleventh year).
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employed a process by which agreements, though not formalized in writ-
ing, may be "implied. 2 95
This exception has become known as "de facto" tenure.29 6 The de
facto tenure doctrine was used in Soni v. Board of Trust~ees,
297 to sup-
port a finding of a property interest in continued employment where
tenure had not been granted under the University's tenure system. The
Sixth Circuit held that a university professor who was an alien and
therefore ineligible for tenure nevertheless had a property interest pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment because there was "sufficient ob-
jective evidence to vest in plaintiff a cognizable property interest in the
form of a reasonable expectation of future and continued employ-
ment."2 9 8
The Ninth Circuit dealt with the application of the de facto tenure
doctrine in Haimowitz v. University of Nevada.299 In Haimowitz, a non-
tenured faculty member whose employment contract was not renewed
claimed to have a protected property interest in continued employment
created by the actions of several of his fellow faculty members. The
Ninth Circuit held that since the university had a formal, written ten-
ure system, of which Haimowitz had full knowledge, the doctrine of de
facto tenure was not applicable. The court thus distinguished Haimo-
witz from the case of Perry v. Sinderman3 °° since in Perry there was no
written tenure system, stating that "the existence of a formal code gov-
erning the granting of tenure precludes a reasonable expectation of
continued employment [property interest] absent extraordinary circum-
stances."3 0' The court also distinguished Soni as being limited to its
"singularly unique facts"3 °2 and denied Haimowitz's claim that he had
a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.
This strict application of the de facto tenure doctrine was continued
295. Id. at 601-02.
296. The de facto tenure doctrine is based on the concept of an implied contract. See
generally 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 561-572A (1960). "The process is gener-
ally regarded by the court as one of true interpretation of the words of the contract, in light
of our language, habits and other circumstances." Id. at 278.
297. 513 F.2d 347, 349-50 (6th Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976) (teacher who
was prevented from obtaining tenure because of a state statute forbidding the granting of
tenure to non-citizens, but who was accorded all rights and privileges of a tenured faculty
member, was entitled to a hearing to protect his fourteenth amendment property interests).
298. Id. at 350 (quoting Soni v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 289, 292 (E.D. Tenn.
1974).
299. 579 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
300. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
301. 579 F.2d at 528.
302. Id.
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by the Ninth Circuit in Davis v. Oregon State Universty.3" 3 Davis
claimed that conversations with his department chairman had estab-
lished a binding employment contract, a written tenure system notwith-
standing. The Ninth Circuit again refused to extend Perry, affirming
the lower court's finding that Davis had not been granted de facto ten-
ure and therefore did not have a property interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment.3°
The clear teaching of Haimowitz and Davis is that a de facto tenure
claim will only be viable if there is no written tenure policy or if there
are extraordinary circumstances, such as those in Soni.
c. Military Pay
In Costello v. United States,3"' the Ninth Circuit considered whether
military retirement pay could be altered prospectively without offend-
ing due process. Pursuant to an Act of Congress in 1963, retirement
pay was calculated with reference to the cost of living index rather than
the active duty pay scales, as it had been previously. After concluding
that appellants, who had retired prior to the 1963 statutory changes,
had "no contract right to have their compensation computed under the
old law," 306 the court confronted the central issue: whether such retire-
ment pay was deferred compensation which was fully earned at the
date of retirement, or whether it was compensation for continuing mili-
tary service. Following the holdings of Lemy v. United States °7 and
Abbott v. United States, °8 the Ninth Circuit ruled that "retirement pay
does not differ from active duty pay in its character as pay for continu-
ing military service. ' 30 9 Based on this interpretation of military retire-
ment pay, the Ninth Circuit ruled that such pay could be altered
prospectively by Congress without offending due process.
310
This holding is supported by the holding of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Larionoff .s In Larionoff, the Court restated that
Congress may prospectively reduce the future pay of members of the
armed services in spite of any general expectations to the contrary,
303. 591 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1978).
304. Id., slip op. at 3694.
305. 587 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978).
306. Id. at 426.
307. 75 F. Supp. 248 (Ct. Cl. 1948). The Lemly court distinguished a "pension" for past
services rendered from "retirement pay."
308. 200 Ct. Cl. 384, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973).
309. 587 F.2d at 427.
310. Id. at 427-28.
311. 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
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whereas Congress may not deprive service members of compensation
for services already rendered.312 Thus, a determination that military
retirement pay is compensation for continuing, future services, as op-
posed to compensation for past services rendered, supports the Ninth
Circuit's holding that such retirement pay can be altered prospectively
without offending due process.
313
2. Last Employer Doctrine
The last employer doctrine states that it is not a denial of due process
to impose full liability for employment related injuries upon the in-
jured employee's last employer, even though the injuries may be a cu-
mulative result of employment by several different employers over the
course of the employee's work life.314 This doctrine was articulated by
Judge Medina of the Second Circuit in Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Cardillo 3 5 and was first followed by the Ninth Circuit in the 1978 case
of Cordero v. Trple A Machine Shop.3 16
In Cordero, the claimant was a welder who had worked for various
employers for over thirty years. The Triple A Machine Shop had been
one of the claimant's employers sporadically during this time and had
been his employer from May 1972 until August 1972, when he was
laid off for lack of work. The claimant returned to Triple A for three
days in October 1972, at which time he was unable to continue work
due to a pulmonary condition.3? 1 7 In November 1975, an administra-
tive law judge found Cordero to be permanently and totally disabled
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as
the result of a pulmonary impairment arising out of his employment as
312. Id. at 879 ("No one disputes that Congress may prospectively reduce the pay of
members of the Armed Forces, even if that reduction deprived members of benefits they had
expected to be able to earn.").
313. 587 F.2d at 428. In Costello, the Ninth Circuit did not deal with the issue of whether
"retirement pay" which is fully earned at retirement can be altered prospectively without
offending due process, but assumed, arguendo, that it could not be divested without compen-
sation. Id. at 427 n.2. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) ("The Four-
teenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of
interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.").
314. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913
(1955). See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969 constitutional); National Indep. Coal Operator's Ass'n v. Brennan,
372 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C.), afid, 419 U.S. 955 (1974) (regulations promulgated under Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 establishing liability of operators for injuries to employ-
ees do not violate the operators' due process or equal protection rights).
315. 225 F.2d at 145.
316. 580 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1978).
317. Id. at 1333.
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a welder.31s The administrative law judge also found Triple A to be
solely liable for Cordero's disability benefits because it was his last em-
ployer. Triple A asserted that this finding violated its due process
rights.
3 19
The Ninth Circuit stated that the rationale underlying the last em-
ployer doctrine of Cardillo is that "all employers will be the last em-
ployer a proportionate share of the time."3 20 Similarly, in National
Independent Coal Operator's Association v. Brennan,32" ' the district
court of the District of Columbia, analyzing the apportionment of lia-
bility for miners' pneumoconiosis (black lung disease) under the fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act322 stated that
it does not violate due process of law to place full liability on one of
several operators responsible for the pneumoconiosis .... [l]t is conso-
nant with due process to presume that an operator for whom a miner
worked for one year contributed to the miner's pneumoconiosis since
there is a rational connection between the fact proven-the one-year em-
ployment-and the fact presumed-the contribution to the development
of the disease.
323
Although ,the injured claimant in National Independent Coal Opera-
tor's Association had been employed for an accumulated period of one
year by the employer on whom liability was placed, and the claimant in
Cordero had only been employed for a little more than three months
by the Triple A Machine Shop, the Ninth Circuit stated that this did
not in any way dilute the principles established in Cardillo.324 The
court held that there was a "rational connection between the length of
employment proven and the contribution to the development and ag-
gravation of the disease" 325 and that the application of the Cardillo
last-employer rule did not, therefore, offend either the due process or
the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.326
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1335-36.
320. Id. at 1336.
321. 372 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C.), af'd, 419 U.S. 955 (1974) (regulations promulgated under
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act establishing liability of responsible operators do not vio-
late the operators' due process or equal protection rights).
322. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-804, 811-821, 841-846, 861-878, 901, 902, 921-924, 931-936, 951-960
(1976).
323. 372 F. Supp. at 24.
324. 580 F.2d at 1336.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1337.
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has applied a two-tiered ap-
proach to questions regarding the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. When a classification is based upon a "suspect"
327
criterion or involves a "fundamental right, '328 the Court has subjected
the classification to "strict scrutiny. 329 On the other hand, the Court
has held that when neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classifica-
tion is involved, the classification need only pass a "rational basis" test
to be constitutionally valid.
330
It is critical to any analysis in this area, then, to first determine the
basis upon which a classification depends. For example, the issue in
the Supreme Court case of Morton v. Mancari331 was whether an em-
ployment preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs consti-
tuted a classification based upon race. The Court stated that "[t]he
preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial
group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose
lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.
'332
The Court held that the classification did not offend the concept of
equal protection 333 because the preference was "reasonable and ration-
ally designed to further Indian self-government. .. .
The Ninth Circuit recently applied the holding of Mancari to Puget
327. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin).
328. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation). But see
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which held that
education is not a fundamental right. The Ninth Circuit recently followed this ruling in
Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
329. See.n re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
330. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); William-
son v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). In 1978, the Ninth Circuit had occasion to
apply the rational basis test in the case of Leigh v. United States, 586 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1978) (per curiam), in which the court upheld Oregon's decision to limit retroactivity of its
new comparative negligence statutes to cases litigated in the trial court after the statutes'
effective date as being rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 123. The Ninth
Circuit also applied the rational basis test in Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School
Dist., 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 1978) ("There exists no constitutional duty imposed by
the Equal Protection Clause to provide bilingual-bicultural education such as the appellants
request.").
331. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
332. Id. at 554.
333. This case was decided under the due process clause of the fifth amendment as it
incorporates the concepts of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 551.
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
334. 417 U.S. at 555. Had the Court determined that this was a racial classification, it
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Sound Gillnetters Association v. United States District Court.335 It held
that orders of certain district courts allocating fishing rights between
treaty Indians and all others was not a classification by race. The court
cited Mancari for the proposition that this was a political rather than a
racial classification.336 It was able to support the position because, as
the court noted, "[a]n ethnic Indian who is not a member of a tribe with
reserved fishing rights is in the same position with respect to Wash-
ington fish and game laws as any other citizen of the state. '337 The
significance of this finding was that, as in Mancari, the classification
became subject to the rational basis test rather than the stringent rules
of strict scrutiny.
Out of the arena of gender-based classification cases there has
emerged a third or middle tier to the traditionally two-tiered approach
to equal protection analysis. As explained by one commentator, "[T]he
middle tier approach does not accept at face value the legislative justifi-
cations for sex discrimination, as does the minimum scrutiny standard,
but neither does it demand the stringent compelling state interest ger-
mane to strict scrutiny."338 However, before a court can decide the de-
gree of scrutiny against which to measure a classification plan, it must
answer the threshold question of whether the plan constitutes gender-
based discrimination.
In De La Cruz v. Torme, 339 the Ninth Circuit was required to deter-
mine the narrow issue of "whether a statutory and constitutional chal-
lenge to facially neutral but allegedly discriminatory official action may
be resolved on the pleadings. '340 To resolve this issue, the court re-
viewed a series of recent Supreme Court cases 341 dealing with govern-
would have been compelled to subject it to the much more arduous standards of strict scru-
tiny.
335. 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978). This case is merely one
in a series of complex litigations concerning the tribal fishing rights of Indians in the north-
west United States. The issue discussed here, while obviously important, was not the central
issue of dispute among the parties.
336. Id. at 1127.
337. Id. at 1130.
338. Comment, Gender-Based Discrimination and Equal Protection: The Emerging Inter-
mediate Standard, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 582, 586 (1977). See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In
deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit
held that a ninth-month pregnancy leave policy did not offend equal protection because it
"substantially protected [state] interests." See text accompanying notes 248-261, supra.
339. 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978).
340. Id. at 47 (Palmieri, J., sitting by designation).
341. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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mental action which, while not facially discriminatory, has the effect of
establishing a gender-based classification scheme.34 z The court stated
that when dealing with an allegation based upon a theory of discrimi-
natory effect,343 the litigants "are required to prove two essential ele-
ments before they can be entitled to relief under the Fourteenth
Amendment: discriminatory effect and invidious discriminatory intent
or purpose." 4 The court found its support for this proposition in both
Washington v. Davis345 and Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.
346
The plaintiffs in De La Cruz were young women of low economic
means who alleged that the San Mateo Community College District
had denied them equal access to educational opportunities because of
the district's policy of "refusing to allow child care facilities on cam-
puses, refusing to apply for or accept funds for the establishment or
maintenance of child care centers, and refusing to allow District funds
to be used for these purposes. ' 347 The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that
these actions violated "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because they constitute
intentional, invidious, gender-based discrimination and because they
are arbitrary and unrelated to the legitimate goal of providing educa-
342. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of what standard of review should apply to
acts of gender-based discrimination. 582 F.2d at 59 ("While it is not clear what level of
'scrutiny' is applicable on the novel facts of this case, we cannot disregard plaintiffs' asser-
tion that, in some respects, defendants' actions promoted no legitimate state interest and
were completely without rational basis.").
343. The theory of "discriminatory effect" is to be distinguished from the concept of gov-
ernmental actions which are facially discriminatory. See generally Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
344. 582 F.2d at 51 (footnote omitted). See Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington
Heights and Beyond." Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F.
961, 1000-01:
The Supreme Court is now completely committed to a rule requiring proof of discrimi-
natory purpose in all types of racial discrimination cases under the equal protection
clause. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall did not join the Court's opinion on this
issue in Davis [Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)], arguing that the statutory
issues made it unnecessary for them to reach the constitutional question. Seven months
later, in Village of Arlington Heights P. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. [429
U.S. 252 (1977)], however, they too endorsed the requirement that purposeful discrimi-
nation is a prerequisite to an equal protection violation.
345. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court "sustained the validity of a qualifying test adminis-
tered to applicants for positions as police officers in the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department." d. at 232.
346. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). "[Ojfficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely be-
cause it results in a racially disproportionate impact. . . .Proof of racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." .d. at 264-
65.
347. 582 F.2d at 47. The court quoted the complaint at length on pages 48-49.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SURVEY
tion."348
In Geduldig v. Aiello,349 the Supreme Court upheld California's ex-
clusions of disabilities resulting from pregnancy from its definition of
"disability" under its state disability insurance program.3 50 The Court
ruled that by such an exclusion "California does not discriminate with
respect to the persons or groups which are eligible for disability insur-
ance protection under the program. The classification challenged in
this case relates to the asserted underinclusiveness of the set of risks
that the State has selected to insure."35' The Court found the state's
actions to involve merely decisions as to the economic allocation of its
resources, stating that "[p]articularly with respect to social welfare pro-
grams, so long as the line drawn by the State is rationally supportable,
the courts will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate stop-
ping point." '352 Two years later, in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert,353 the
Court put aside any doubt as to its intended meaning in Geduldig by
stating that the "reason for rejecting appellee's equal protection claim
in that case was that the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage under
California's disability-benefits plan was not in itself discrimination
based on sex."' 354 And, in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,3"s the Court reaf-
firmed its position but drew a distinction between not extending "to
women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive. . . [and] im-
pos[ing] on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer.' 356
The majority in De La Cruz, however, distinguished these three
cases from the case at hand on the grounds that
[T]he essence of plaintiffs' grievance is that the absence of child care facil-
ities renders the included benefits less valuable and less available to wo-
348. Id. at 47.
349. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
350. Id. at 497.
351. Id. at 494.
352. Id. at 495.
353. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert, the Court applied the reasoning of Geduldig to a case
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and validated General Electric's
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its Weekly Sickness and Accident Insurance
Plan.
354. Id. at 135.
355. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
356. Id. at 142.
Two separate policies are at issue in this case. The first is petitioner's practice of giving
sick pay to employees disabled by reason of nonoccupational sickness or injury but not
to those disabled by pregnancy. The second is petitioner's practice of denying accumu-
lated seniority to female employees returning to work following disability caused by
childbirth.
Id. at 138 (footnote omitted). The second practice was held to be a burden in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 143.
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men; in other words, that the effect of the District's child care policy is to
render the entire "package" of its educational programs of lesser worth to
women than to men.
3 5 7
The majority held that since it failed to appear "to a certainty under
existing law that no relief [could] be granted under any set of facts that
might be proved in support of plaintiffs' claim, ' 35s and since plaintiffs
alleged both a discriminatory effect and "a course of conduct by the
defendants susceptible of an inference of intentional discrimina-
tion, ' 35 9 it was improper to dismiss the claim on the pleadings.360
Susan J. Glass
Nick '. Saggese
357. 582 F.2d at 56.
358. Id. at 48.
359. Id. at 58.
360. During the survey period, the Ninth Circuit distinguished De La Cruz in the case of
Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. School Dist., 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
There we held that a complaint that alleged 'a course of conduct by defendants suscep-
tible of an inference of intentional discrimination' on the basis of sex contrary to the
Equal Protection Clause survived a motion to dismiss. Appellants here alleged no
course of conduct from which an inference of intentional discrimination can be drawn.
They acknowledge that the remedial instruction in English is sufficient to allow Mexi-
can-American and Yaqui students to participate effectively in the educational program.
A failure to do more constitutes no intentionally discriminatory course of conduct con-
demned by the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 1028-29 (citation and footnote omitted).
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